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I. Governance versus the rule of law:  
comitology under threat? 
Although the Lisbon Treaty has dispensed with much of the reformist lawyerly 
zeal of the draft constitutional treaty, Article 290 of the new Consolidated 
Treaty (TFEU) may yet give some measure of comfort to those who had hoped 
for comprehensive overhaul of the Community’s Byzantine scheme of legisla-
tion and implementation.1 Above all, although the cumbersome historical dis-
tinction made between regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions lives on in Article 288 TFEU (ex 249 EC), the new Article 290 may be 
argued to have at last established a nascent ‘hierarchy of norms’ within the  
Union, placing explicit Treaty limits, as well as operational conditions (to be de-
termined by the Council and by the European Parliament), upon the exercise of 
delegated powers and implementing competences by the European Commission. 
Thus, for example, a delegation of powers to the Commission ‘to adopt non-
legislative acts of general application’ may now only occur where so stipulated 
within an originating legislative act, and only to the degree that such a delegated 
power ‘supplement[s]’ or ‘amend[s] certain non-essential elements of that legis-
lative act’ (Article 290(1)). Equally, Article 290(2a) TFEU imposes a duty upon 
Parliament and Council ‘explicitly’ to detail the conditions upon which a power 
is exercised (e.g., by means of a sunset clause detailing the temporal limits of 
the delegation); and further stipulates that ‘delegated acts’ may only ‘come into 
force’ where the Parliament and Council have raised no objections within a pre-
determined time limit (Article 290(2)(b)). 
Talk of the establishment of a hierarchy of norms may appear obscure to 
non-lawyers. Equally, the complexities of treaty language also obscure the im-
mediate significance for the ‘governance’ of the European Union of Article 290 
TFEU. Nonetheless, the Commission’s urgent response to the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty – airing its views on the best means of implementing Article 
2902 – at once reveals the practical institutional and political importance of a 
new hierarchy of norms within the EU. Thus, for the Commission, the vital un-
derlying issue is one of the impact of Article 290 upon the system of ‘comitol-
ogy’ formally established by the Comitology Decision,3 and operated enthusias-
tically by the Commission as a framework within which it might exercise pow-
                                                 
1  Aided and abetted by Article 291 governing management of member state compe-
tences. 
2  COM(2009) 673 final. 
3  Decision 1999/468/EC, as amended by Decision 2006/512/EC, OJ L 255/11, 
22.7.2006. 
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ers delegated to it by the Council under the former Article 145 EC Treaty. In the 
view of the Commission, the stipulations of Article 290 TFEU are comparable, 
though not identical, with ‘the regulatory procedure with scrutiny introduced by 
Decision 2006/512/EC4’, and may thus – reading between the lines of the argu-
ment – herald a possible curtailment of the huge variety of comitology proce-
dures they deploy. However, they are not necessarily a threat to the system of 
delegated powers and comitology per se, especially since comitology is seem-
ingly encouraged by the new Article 291 TFEU governing implementation at 
national level. Others are not so sanguine. For the European Parliament, a long 
standing enemy of comitology, which possesses an abiding suspicion that its ar-
cane procedures have been deployed to subvert parliamentary competences,5 the 
rationalising effects of Article 290 appear to be welcome as sounding the death-
knell for the practice. In theory, Parliament might thus establish such egregious 
limitations to delegated powers within legislative acts that all further manifesta-
tions of the comitology system are strangled at birth. 
Abstracting to the level of constitutional design, a post-Lisbon context of 
potential conflict between Commission and Parliament on the appropriateness 
or otherwise of comitology procedures might accordingly also be argued to be 
a context of retrenchment: a period of the revenge of the rule of law, and of a 
reassertion of a fixed hierarchy of norms against the ad hoc system of ‘govern-
ance’ that has come to characterise the latter stages of European integration. In 
other words, where the evolution of comitology has answered unforeseen de-
mands within the legal structures of the European Treaties – for administrative 
capacity, for national/supranational co-operation and for expert advice – it has 
joined a host of contingently constituted executive bodies and procedures that 
are intrinsically foreign to the treaties; bodies and procedures such as semi-
autonomous European agencies and the Open Method of Co-ordination whose 
legitimacy has generally been measured far less in formal normative categories 
of explicit treaty basis or clearly apportioned competence, and far more in 
terms of functional efficiency or an ability ‘to do the required job’.6 Histori-
cally vulnerable to accusations of opaqueness or lack of transparency7 and 
                                                 
4  OJ L 255/11, 22.7.2006. 
5  A suspicion often aired before the ECJ; see, for example cases, Case C-302/87 Euro-
pean Parliament v Council of the European Communities [1988] ECR 5615, and Case 
C-70/88 European Parliament v Council of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-
4529 (Re: Radioactive Food), known as ‘Chernobyl’. 
6  M. Everson, ‘Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?,’ 1:2 (1995) European Law 
Journal 180-204. 
7  J. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: ‘‘Comitology’’ as Revolution – Infranationalism, Constitutiona-
lism, and Democracy’, in: Ch. Joerges & E. Vos (eds.), EU Committees: Social Regu-
lation, Law and Politics, Oxford 1999: Hart Publishing, pp. 339-350. 
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similarly viewed with suspicion by institutions of democratic representation, 
this ad hoc governance executive may now face a potentially fatal challenge in 
the guise of renewed assertion of traditional constitutional concepts such as the 
hierarchy of norms, which demands a clear and limited mandate of delegation 
within foreseen and foreseeable institutional structures. 
Such an assessment is nonetheless premature. Although national govern-
ments may not wish to revisit treaty structures for at least a decade the EU 
clearly remains a work in progress, with its own operational demands for gov-
ernance structures that lie outside the traditional rule of law. ‘The committee 
structure is a valuable contribution to the federal principle ensuring the in-
volvement of all entities of the Eurosystem in the preparation of the ECB deci-
sion’.8 far beyond the traditional reach of Commission’ comitology, various 
national central bankers have thus recently written in support of a new system 
of ‘consultative’ committees, established under the rules of procedure of the 
European Central Bank (ECB),9 in order to aid the decision-making bodies of 
the European System of Central Banks (ECSB) and the ECB – more particu-
larly the Governing Council and Executive Board – in the exercise of their de-
cision-making competences. Made up of members of National Central Banks 
(NCBs) and members of the ECB, newly founded committees, such as the Le-
gal Committee of the European Central Bank (LEGCO), have thus already 
played their own useful part in the slow unfolding, in particular, of the Euro-
system, which is growing up to govern the technical management of the single 
‘Euro’ currency. Indeed, such would seem to be the utility of such ‘consulta-
tive’ committees within the evolving system, that a debate has now developed 
around the question of whether ECB/ESCB committees might usefully also be 
given properly delegated decision-making powers of their own, or a status as 
‘management’ committees.10 
The vital underlying point of this development for this paper is both opera-
tional and normative in character. ‘Governance’, or the simple fact of the crea-
tion of unforeseen executive or administrative structures for the management 
of integration processes, appears to remain an unavoidable functional charac-
teristic of the European Union. For all that national governments may yet seek 
to imbue the Lisbon Treaty with an epoch defining finality, processes of Euro-
pean integration have not reached an end point or a finalité that might be easily 
captured by or reflected within finite institutional-constitutional structures. The 
                                                 
8  Etienne de L’honeux (Secretary General, Banque Centrale de Luxembourg), 3 Eure-
dia 2009, pp. 455-485, at p. 473. 
9  Article 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (ECB/2004/2). 
10  Etienne de L’honeux (Secretary General, Banque Centrale de Luxembourg), 3 Eure-
dia 2009, pp. 455-485, at p. 474. 
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operational demands of integration are still being met within ad hoc executive 
structures. At the same time, however, voices of normative suspicion have 
grown in volume and constitutional significance and point to Article 290 as a 
potent symbol of such reformist aspirations. In this contrasting analysis, gov-
ernance is a simple analytical concept, deployed by political scientists, in order 
to categorise institutions of national, supranational and even global manage-
ment and control,11 but lacking in any deeper legitimating force of its own. In-
stead, as the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty forcefully remind us, executive or 
administrative legitimacy is still surely to be found within the historical notion 
of ‘transmission-belt’ control;12 that is, the establishment of limited adminis-
trative mandates within a hierarchy of norms that are subject always to parlia-
mentary and governmental recall, and that are policed by a rule of law that 
seeks to defend a polity, or its political competence, by strictly constraining 
and controlling the executive. 
This clash between the normative and the practical, between a desire to es-
tablish more traditional means of legitimation for the sui generis EU and the 
contrasting demands of that unique body for the establishment of an executive 
that enables it to perform its allotted functions will undoubtedly outlive ratifi-
cation of the ‘epoch defining’ Lisbon Treaty. Alternatively, for lawyers, the 
outstanding task unquestionably – if uncomfortably – remains one of adapting 
constitutional theory, constitutional practice, administrative law and the legal 
structures of executive design in order to ensure both the functionality and the 
legitimacy of the institutional structures of the European Union. The task is 
onerous and multidisciplinary, requiring both the forensic interrogation of tra-
ditional notions of constitutional theory, in order to identify the generic lines of 
constitutional legitimation that may yet transfer to a sui generis EU, and an 
understanding of patterns of social organisation that derive their own inde-
pendent (non-normative) legitimacy by furnishing the EU with adequate insti-
tutional capacity to ensure that it can do its job. Certainly, in this regard, fact 
may not be allowed to lead norm: ‘invented’ institutions of European govern-
ance do not become legitimate simply by virtue of their ‘invention’. Nonethe-
less, the example of an emerging ‘comitology’ within the ESCB and ECB 
proves particularly instructive: as the ramifications of the recent financial crisis 
                                                 
11  Pointing to the danger of this tendency, with specific reference to the OMC, Ch. Joer-
ges, ‘What is Left of the European Economic Constitution?’, in: W. Matiaske, H. 
Brunkhorst, G. Grözinger & M. Neves (eds.), The European Union as a Model for the 
Development of Mercosur? Transnational orders between Economical Efficiency and 
Political Legitimacy, Mering 2007: Rainer Hampp Verlag 2007, pp. 19-52. 
12  See, for details of the origins of the concept, M. Everson, ‘Independent Agencies: Hi-
erarchy Beaters?,’ 1:2 (1995) European Law Journal 180-204. 
  5
have amply demonstrated, nowhere is the demand for ‘empirical’ legitimation 
more potent than in the area of money management. Simply stated, and all tra-
ditional-historical notions of transmission belt executive control apart, the le-
gitimacy of the ESCB and ECB resides firmly in its ability to ‘do its job’, or its 
ability to maintain the credibility of a youngish currency upon whose survival 
the interests of the continent as a whole rest. 
II. A constitutional legitimacy for comitology:  
between functionality, representation and deliberation 
1. Transmission and the ban on delegation 
Contemporary notions of transmission-belt administration, norm-hierarchy and 
non-delegation have their common antecedents within the ‘Enlightenment’ 
constitution and, above all, within the concept of the representative democratic 
primacy of the people. Accordingly, where once the ban on non-delegation 
was designed simply to preserve the absolute powers of the despotic sovereign, 
the Enlightenment constitution imbued this power-consolidating construct with 
a far deeper normative meaning. Consequently, the powers that were and are 
now to be protected are those of the people: that is, the sovereign powers of a 
constitution-creating polity personified within its own institutions of represen-
tative democracy. As a result, highly technical legal formulas demanding, on 
the one hand, that legislative mandates to the administration be strictly con-
straining – allowing little if any administrative autonomy – and, on the other, 
requiring the law to police any alienation of legislative competence by means 
of rigorous application of the rule of law to the administration, have their own 
inspirational underpinnings within the constitutive building blocks of constitu-
tional and democratic theory.13 
The fundamental inspirational consequences of constitutionally derived no-
tions of non-delegation may be readily identified within the modern European 
Union. Above all, the Maastricht and Lisbon Judgments of the German Consti-
tutional Court, in their forensic examination of the legitimacy or otherwise of 
the delegation of powers by the Federal Government to the EU under Article 
25(3) of the German Constitution, are clear embodiment of a rule of law, 
which extends far beyond application of arcane procedural legal formats, such 
as ultra vires, to investigate instead highly existential questions of the preser-
                                                 
13  M. Everson, ‘Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?’, 1:2 (1995) European Law 
Journal 180-204. 
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vation of the German polity in the face of the burgeoning competences of an 
external executive body (the EU).14 Thus, German judicial emphasis upon Ar-
ticle 38 of the Federal Constitution – the stipulation that sovereign power de-
rives from the people – similarly leads the Court into comprehensive and em-
pirical analysis of German democratic process and the necessary conditions 
under which such democratic process might still properly be termed sovereign, 
even in the face of wide-scale transfer of executive competence to the Euro-
pean Union.15 
As can be noted, the German Court’s readiness to engage in empirical 
analysis, or the ‘reality’ of the vital sovereign giving qualities of representative 
democratic process, are an immediate indication that strict norm-fact divides 
are also elusive within traditional constitutional theory, such that the workings 
of the notion of transmission belt administration may be modified within the 
conventional confines of a constitutional court ‘in the light of circum-
stances’.16 Nonetheless, and not to pre-empt such fact-norm complexities, 
simple legal extrapolations of the ban on delegation and the rule of law may 
yet prove to be an immutable barrier to delegation of powers, even where per-
suasive functional reasons for such a delegation exist; a potential problem that 
can immediately be highlighted by virtue of an initial, though basic, legal 
analysis of potential ‘non-delegation’ hurdles to establishment of comitology 
‘proper’ within the workings of the ECB and ESCB system. 
Accordingly, the Lisbon Treaty, and above all Articles 282-4 TFEU concre-
tising the status of the ECB as an institution of the European Union, might 
now be argued to have ended all possible controversy on the autonomous char-
acter of the ECB and ESCB, and thus to have determined that the general ban 
on delegation applying within the EU will also apply squarely to executive 
conduct of its monetary policy. Alternatively, where once the ECB attempted 
to argue that its lack of institutional status and heightened independence under 
Article 108 EC (now, Article 130 TFEU) precluded application to it of the 
general scheme of Community law,17 the inclusion of the ECB and ESCB 
within the Treaty Title enumerating the European institutions seems to confirm 
that the Bank is indeed subject to general Community law provisions. As a re-
sult, the conduct of monetary policy as laid down in the Treaty (Articles 127-
133 TFEU) must now surely be considered to be subject to the general Com-
                                                 
14  Brunner v European Union Treaty CMLR [1994] 57 and ‘Maastricht,’ German Con-
stitutional Court decision from 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 89. 
15  See, Brunner v European Union Treaty CMLR [1994] 57. 
16  See, Brunner v European Union Treaty CMLR [1994] 57. 
17  Case C-11/00, ‘OLAF’, Commission of the European Communities v European Cen-
tral Bank [2003] ECR I-7147. 
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munity prohibition on non-delegation established by the infamous Meroni doc-
trine of the European Court of Justice,18 giving constitutional force to a princi-
ple of the balance of powers – or the ‘institutional balance’ – which includes a 
dual injunction that all institutions of the EU must work within the compe-
tences allotted to them and may never delegate those competences to institu-
tions not named within the Treaty. 
Reformulated within the Lisbon Treaty as a ‘conferral of powers principle’, 
the institutional balance and Meroni doctrine have long barred, for example, 
the establishment in the EU of true ‘autonomous’ decision-making agencies in 
the mould of independent US regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade 
Commission.19 By the same token, the enumeration in Article 129 of the Lis-
bon Treaty of a limited number of decision-making bodies within the ECB and 
ESCB (Governing Council and Executive Board), may accordingly be argued 
– under the conferral of powers principle – to preclude establishment of further 
decision-making instances to aid in the operation of monetary policy. Further, 
although Article 45(1) of the Statute of the ECB and ESCB recognises the 
General Council as a ‘third decision-making body of the ECB’ – one including 
the governors of NCBs of countries who have not adopted the Euro – this just 
as surely completes a finite list of bodies, recognised within European law, 
who may actively exercise the monetary competences of the EU. Beyond its 
very informal recourse to ‘consultative’ committees in order to aid in the 
preparation of decision-making within the ECB and ESCB, the Bank – or so it 
can be argued – may not establish any formalised (decision-making) commit-
tees to conduct its monetary business. 
2. Transmission revised and the normative power of ‘functionality’ 
All such projected legal pedantry law aside, the reality of historical processes 
of European integration is nonetheless one of the dominance – at least within 
the sphere of the Commission’s legislative initiative – of committee proceed-
ings taking place outside the named institutions of the Treaty. As painstaking 
analysis has shown, approximately 50,000 decisions were taken by agricultural 
and regulatory committees between 1971 and 1995.20 The years since passage 
of the Comitology Decision have similarly seen little if any abatement in 
                                                 
18  Meroni v High Authority, [1962] ECR 73. 
19  See, M. Everson, ‘Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters’, 1:2 (1995) European 
Law Journal 180-204. 
20  J. Falke, ‘Comitology and other committees: a preliminary empirical assessment’, in: 
R.H. Pedler & G.F. Schaefer (eds.), Shaping European Law and Policy, Maastricht 
1996: EIPA, pp. 117-165. 
  8
committee activity, with the latest annual Commission Report on Comitology 
detailing that 2185 opinions were delivered by 270 comitology committees in 
the year 2008.21 Is then, the European system – or at least to the degree that its 
operations are founded upon the opinions and decisions of committees – an af-
front to the rule of law, to the ban on non-delegation now implied within the 
principle of the conferral of powers? 
The answer to this question is ‘no’, but a no that nonetheless exists within 
multiple tensions; tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranational-
ism, between ‘good’ and technical decision-making, between the tendency for 
intergovernmentalist bargaining and the need for political consensus-building, 
between a functional requirement for ‘appropriate’ and a normative demand 
for ‘legitimate’ decision-making, and between the realm of governance and 
that of the rule of law. In other words, although the ECJ has consistently con-
firmed the legality of comitology proceedings in the face of firm parliamentary 
opposition to them,22 their exact normative or constitutional foundations re-
main highly elusive both within the literature and before the Court, with comi-
tology appearing contrastingly as prosaic child of regulatory necessity, as re-
flection of political compromise and as creature of constitutional renewal. 
The history of the establishment of comitology as a procedure formalised 
by the Comitolgy Decision,23 is instructive. The administrative and technical 
capacities of the European Community and Union have always been small, and 
its competences broad. Accordingly recourse to external expertise, gathered 
informally together in committees, always suggested itself as a mode of bridg-
ing this ‘administrative gap’. With arrival of the Commission White Paper of 
1985 for completion of the internal market,24 however, the issue changed in 
both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Historical modes of market inte-
gration such as regulatory approximation, mutual recognition or even regula-
tory competition were ill-suited to the wide-ranging ‘deepening’ of integration 
posited by the single market programme, especially in view of the member 
states’ continued recourse to their residual competences under Article 36 
TFEU (ex 30 EC) in order to regulate their markets in defence of the health 
and safety of their own consumers. Accordingly, in addition to overcoming an 
administrative gap, the Commission was now also required to overcome a 
                                                 
21  European Commission, (2008) Report from the Commission on the Working of Com-
mittees during 2008, COM(2009) 335 final. 
22  Often in the face of parliamentary opposition, see, Case C-302/87 European Parlia-
ment v Council of the European Communities [1988] ECR 5615. 
23  Decision 1999/468/EC, as amended by Decision 2006/512/EC (OJ L 255/11, 
22.7.2006). 
24  C0M(85) 310 final. 
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‘regulatory gap’, or a mismatch between the supranational interest in market 
regulation (Article 32 TFEU (ex 28 EC)) and residual national regulatory 
competences. It chose to tackle this with the ‘New Approach’, whereby 
framework directives would be augmented by technical standards established 
within committees of interest groups, technical experts and national representa-
tives and subsequently approved by the Commission. Approximation of market 
regulation would be achieved by means of a general framework of regulation, 
supplemented by administrative/executive technical standard setting, designed 
to achieve a ‘high level of protection’ for European citizens (Article 108(s) 
Single European Act). 
The complicating factor within this new arrangement, however, was not 
simply the fact that the Commission was now explicitly exercising powers 
delegated to it by the Council under the then Article 145 EC, but rather the re-
ality that the Commission, together with its extended cohort of interest groups, 
experts and national representatives, was similarly exercising the regulatory 
competences of the member states. In particular, as the technical complexities 
of EU regulation have increased to the degree that the Commission is itself 
now often identified as a ‘blind driver’, directed rather than informed in its de-
cision-making by the eyes of its expert and scientific committees,25 a dual 
problem of legislative pre-emption by the EU executive has thus grown ever-
more acute: on the one hand, with regard to the pre-emption of the legislative 
competences of the institutions of the Community, and particularly those of the 
Parliament within co-decision procedures;26 and, on the other hand, in relation 
to the supranational colonisation of the residual competences – and thus popu-
lar sovereignty – of the member states.27 
The problem of potential legislative pre-emption both at EU and at member 
state level may go some way to explaining the extraordinarily complex series 
of procedures that are to be found in the Comitology Decision. 
                                                 
25  M. Everson & E. Vos, ‘The scientification of politics and the politicisation of sci-
ence’, in: Vos & Everson (eds.), Uncertain Risks, Abingdon 2008: Routledge Caven-
dish, pp. 1-17. 
26  Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council of the European Communities [1991] 
ECR I-4529 (Re: Radioactive Food), known as ‘Chernobyl’. 
27  Specifically with regard to the governance of GMOs, M. Everson & E. Vos, ‘The sci-
entification of politics and the politicisation of science’, in: Vos & Everson (eds.), Un-
certain Risks, Abingdon 2008: Routledge Cavendish, pp. 1-17. 
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The effect of comitology opinions on the Commissions ability to adopt legislation 
 Favourable opinion No opinion Negative opinion 
Advisory 
procedure 
Adopts Can Adopt Can Adopt 
Management  
procedure 
Adopts Can Adopt Referral to Coun-
cil 
Regulatory  
procedure 
Adopts Referral to 
Council 
Referral to Coun-
cil 
Regulatory  
procedure  
with scrutiny 
Adopts (but can still 
be opposed by the 
European Parliament)
Referral to 
Council and 
European Par-
liament 
Referral to Coun-
cil and European 
Parliament 
Safeguard  
procedure28 
N/A N/A N/A 
Thus, in particular, the ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny’ is designed to pre-
serve the competences of the European Parliament in areas where Commission 
activity appears to impinge too greatly upon democratic processes at EU level, 
at least in the eyes of Parliament. Nonetheless, as continued parliamentary 
doubts about comitology indicate, procedural inventiveness is not sufficient to 
overcome legitimacy concerns. In short, comitology may very well be a neces-
sary instrument of EU governance because it supplies the Commission with the 
necessary technical expertise for management of the internal market and like-
wise furnishes co-operative structures in an area of joint EU/member state 
competence. However, it still stands in a tense relationship with the deep-
seated constitutional prerogatives of popular sovereignty. 
In this latter respect then, the issue of an alternative form of normative le-
gitimation for comitology becomes a pressing one. Certainly, ‘governance’, 
often dominated by soft law mechanisms such as ‘naming and shaming’, 
might, in its analytical character be argued to contain a normativity all of its 
own: governance arises as a form of management in circumstances that require 
problem-solving, yet defy intervention on the part of traditional governmental 
structures.29 Most visible within the supranational or international setting, 
                                                 
28  Where the safeguard procedure is used, the Commission does not have to convene a 
committee. However, its proposal will not become law unless the Council agrees to it 
within a specified time-limit. 
29  De Búrca, G. and Scott, J. (eds.), Law and New Governance in the EU and US, Ox-
ford 2006: Hart Publishing, pp. 4-10. 
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structures or vehicles of governance act to ensure that problems may be solved 
and, more particularly, that ‘patterns of co-operation’ may also be established 
between ‘sovereign’ instances of decision-making which would otherwise 
stand in an inimical relationship to one another. Alternatively, given that vehi-
cles of governance furnish solutions and provide for co-operation beyond any 
traditional conceptual limitation or ascription of competence and sovereignty, 
they surely derive a positive – that is, normative – legitimacy in that they en-
sure that a necessary ‘job is done’. 
Nonetheless, the normativity of functionality is likewise just as surely cir-
cumscribed: what price a job done, if it is not done well; what is the value of 
national/supranational co-operation if such co-operation produces arbitrary re-
sults with little or no cross-referencing – Rückkopplung – to the original nor-
mativity of the Enlightenment constitution, to the sovereignty of the people 
embodied in representative institutions? To this exact degree then, the dual af-
firmation by the ECJ of the normative significance of processes of na-
tional/supranational co-operation and of appropriate problem-solving,30 is just 
as surely underpinned by legitimating considerations of a far deeper nature. 
Thus, on the one hand, although the ECJ’s 1994 WTO Judgment confirmed 
that where competences ‘fall partly into the competence of the Community and 
in part within that of the member states it is essential to ensure close co-
operation between the member states and the Community institutions’;31 on 
the other hand, such co-operation must surely be of a quality that exceeds sim-
ple ‘bargaining’ between the member states and the Commission. By the same 
token, the Court’s acceptance in the case of Chernobyl of the principle that 
parliamentary co-decision competences may temporarily be sidestepped by an 
executive (in this case, the Council) in the interests of expeditious decision-
making and problem solving,32 must equally reside in a confidence that deci-
sion-making and problem solving occurring in this emergency mode is not 
simply ‘arbitrary’, but is rather the ‘best possible’ problem-solving available 
under the circumstances. 
As a consequence, the most potent of theories seeking to identify a deeper 
normative legitimacy for governance, and more particularly, for comitology as 
                                                 
30  See Opinion of the ECJ on the WTO, Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-526 and Case C-
70/88 European Parliament v Council of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-
45297. 
31  Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-526. 
32  Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council of the European Communities [1991] 
ECR I-4529. 
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a vehicle of governance,33 does not overly dwell on the most immediately ap-
parent of legal justifications for the presence of comitology within the internal 
market setting: that is, the notion that the reintegration of national representa-
tives within the supranational regulatory process does not, in fact, undermine 
the institutional balance, but instead reinforces it, as the regulatory gap be-
tween Articles 32 and 36 TFEU is closed with due respect for the need for the 
member states to be properly represented within supranational decision-
making which impinges upon national competences. Certainly, such a reading 
of the compatibility of comitology with the institutional balance of powers has 
much to recommend it, in particular as it might thus also – in a real world of 
practical decision-making – be seen as a compromise ‘between the need for 
more effective Community decision-making and the member states’ desire to 
preserve national influence over Commission decisions.’34 Nonetheless, this 
supranational/national act of co-operation, giving rise to a fusion of adminis-
trative and political systems, where committees work in partnership to jointly 
manage ‘situations of increasing independence’, might equally be argued to be 
an affront to the separation of powers – confusing administrative and political 
functions – and thus to the rule of law should such co-operation not be disci-
plined by an overarching norm of polity-building that is not only as powerful 
as the ‘we the people’ of Enlightenment thought, but which also actively aims 
to give effect to the claim to universality of the traditional constitutional set-
tlement. Accordingly, in this theory, comitology gains its normativity, or its 
constitutionality, to the exact degree that it represents an act of enforced and 
disciplined co-operation between (national) political and (supranational) ex-
ecutive bodies that aims acts to ‘correct’ the in-built exclusionary tendencies of 
the national constitution. Alternatively, comitology is an answer to the paradox 
of a ‘universal’ settlement that limits itself within territorial boundaries, disre-
garding the interests, of those people who find themselves outside the sover-
eign polity. Comitology thus achieves constitutionality to the exact degree that 
it forces sovereign polities to recognise that their representative democratic 
processes also have impacts far beyond their own territorial boundaries, and to 
ameliorate them accordingly with reference to a wider community of ‘suprana-
                                                 
33  Ch. Joerges, ‘Deliberative Supranationalism – Two Defences’, (2002) 8:1 European 
Law Journal, pp. 133-151. 
34  R. Pedler & K. Bradley, ‘The Commission, Policy Management and Comitology’, in: 
D. Spence & G. Edwards (eds.), The European Commission, London 2006: John 
Harper Publishing, pp. 240-241. 
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tional interest’.35 
In other words, consensus building – or co-operation – within committees 
acquires its particular normative/constitutional character to the extent that in-
teraction between a supranational administration, national political representa-
tives, independent technical experts and social interests, not only provides 
formal cross-referencing to representative democratic process at national level, 
but also proceeds in line with a disciplining supranational ‘conflicts norm’; or, 
a ‘deliberative’ demand that the balancing of technical, executive and political 
interests – at the same time the balancing of national and supranational inter-
ests – occurs in a open and transparent manner, unmarred by the pursuit of 
hidden national self-interest and disciplined by commonly regarded and le-
gally-recognised goals, such as market integration, rational decision-making, 
the maintenance of a ‘high level’ of protection for European consumers and 
continuing respect for the national peculiarities of regulation.36 
In distinct rebuttal of common modes of intergovernmentalism, a normative 
form of governance thus proceeds apace in line with the legally-assured domi-
nance of ‘arguing’ over ‘bargaining’. Consensus is not of itself an independent 
value, but only becomes such where the rule of law is removed from a realm of 
formal legal application – such as the mantra of the transmission belt model of 
administration – and is reborn in proceduralised form; where application of 
legal principles of transparency and rationality joins with pursuit of legally-
assured goals of market integration, consumer protection and respect for na-
tional political process, in order to ensure that consensus is built around ‘good’ 
decision-making. Fact and norm are entwined and the essential characters, both 
of the rule of law and of an analytical category of governance are altered in or-
der to ensure that it is possible to meet the functional demand for problem-
solving and decision-making outside the traditional abstract demands of the 
Enlightenment constitution, but, at the same time, to reinforce the substance of 
the primary historical value (universalism) that has informed that constitution. 
Certainly, lying between functionality, representation and deliberation, 
comitology is inevitably vulnerable to empirical tensions between intergov-
ernmentalism and supranationalism, between bargaining and arguing and be-
tween necessity and norm. Thus the countless studies – including those of the 
                                                 
35  Denoted deliberative supranationalism (I) within the theory. See, Ch. Joerges, ‘Delibe-
rative Supranationalism – Two Defences’, (2002) 8:1 European Law Journal, pp. 133-
151. 
36  Denoted deliberative supranationalism (II). 
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Commission37 – which demonstrate a high level of consensus in comitology 
proceedings may always be countered by other studies highlighting a lack of 
deliberation in committee proceedings, especially in politically sensitive areas, 
such as the budget.38 Equally, and vitally so, the complexities of modern regu-
lation, especially in the fields of emerging technologies (GMOs) will likewise 
always raise a spectre of the negating ‘scientification’ of deliberation, as su-
pranational and national interests cede to expert advise which can no longer be 
understood, let alone challenged.39 Nonetheless and beyond these very impor-
tant limitations, comitology – properly constructed and overseen by a proce-
duralised rule of law – can perhaps act to overcome the continuing tension be-
tween the need for effective decision-making within the EU and the demand 
for appropriate legitimation, and can further contribute to an amelioration of 
the antagonism between analytical categories of governance and the formal 
construction of the rule of law. 
III. The Challenge of ECB/ESCB Governance within the  
Treaties 
There can be little or no doubt that the ECB, together with its partner ESCB, is 
not merely an immediate focus for the emergence of governance structures be-
yond the named institutions of the Treaty. Instead, taken together, the ECB and 
ESCB are just as surely a striking manifestation of the appearance of govern-
ance structures within the Treaty. In other words, it may be argued that, in ad-
dition to the high level of expertise that the operation of the Eurosystem de-
mands – a degree and level of expertise that defies the very limited resources 
of the ECB itself40 – governance beyond traditional modes of governmental 
                                                 
37  Thus, for example, the 2008 Annual Report of the Commission on Comitology reports 
that of 2185 opinions delivered in 2008, only one was negative. Similarly, in only 35 
cases did committees fail to issue an opinion. See, also Ch. Joerges & J. Neyer ‘From 
Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The. Constitutiona-
lisation of Comitology’, (1997) 3 European Law Journal 273, reporting on consensus 
building and respect for rationality in foodstuffs committees. 
38  R. Pedler & K. Bradley, ‘The Commission, Policy Management and Comitology’, in: 
D. Spence & G. Edwards (eds.), The European Commission, London 2006: John 
Harper Publishing, pp. 240-241, at p. 241. 
39  M. Everson & Ch. Joerges, ‘Consumer Citizenship in Postnational Constellations?’, 
in: Kate Soper & Frank Trentmann (eds.), Citizenship and Consumption, New York 
2007: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 201-222. 
40  Ch. Zilioli & M. Selmayr, ‘Recent Developments in the Law of the European Central 
Bank’, in: P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Yearbook of European Law 2006 (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2006), pp. 63-64. 
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operation is a simple given within the current provisions of the Treaty and the 
ECB Statute. Most strikingly in this regard, primary Community law assigns 
the pursuit and management of EU monetary policy, not to a single identifiable 
supranational institution, but rather to a ‘system’ of banks, comprising NCBs 
and the ECB (Article 127(2) TFEU & Article 3(1) Statute). Certainly, the 
Governing Council and the Executive Board of the ECB are recognised as ‘de-
cision-making bodies’ and apportioned the ‘responsibility’ for ‘performance of 
the tasks of the ECSB’; yet, this centralising supranational impulse within 
Community law immediately contrasts with the stark fact that the Governing 
Council of the ECB is made up of the governors of NCBs who maintain their 
own institutional personality (Article 14(1) Statute), are shareholders of the 
ECB, are the primary conduit for implementation of the monetary functions 
and operations of the ESCB (Articles 17-33 Statute) and retain competence to 
perform tasks outside the ESCB; or at the least, do so to the degree that such 
functions do not ‘interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB’ (Article 
14(4) Statute). 
In an explicitly radical departure from the ‘community method’, the Treaty 
dictates that a ‘system’, made up of executive banking bodies at national and 
supranational level performs all of the tasks associated with the aim of pursuit 
of a Community monetary policy, from legislative initiative through to regula-
tory decision-making and technical implementation of policy; and further per-
forms these tasks within a highly uncertain and fluid complex of national and 
supranational competences. To be sure, such an uncertain complex of compe-
tence also owes much to the fraught history of the establishment of monetary 
union and the Eurosystem, and to a commonly exercised mode of European 
integration that continues to overcome fundamental political disagreement on 
the future nature of the Union itself by means of legal arrangements which ap-
pear, implicitly at least, to encourage ‘stealthy’ processes of institutional spill-
over.41 However, this often seen functional imperative for ever closer na-
tional/supranational co-operation, as well as for pooling of technical/executive 
expertise, appears nonetheless to be much heightened in the particular case of 
monetary union and given explicit, rather than implicit, recognition within the 
institutional provisions of the TFEU and ECB/ESCB Statute. 
In other words, it may be argued that, in contrast to the stated aims of a 
community method founded in supranational legislative initiative (by the 
Commission), national/supranational policy-making (by the Council) and na-
                                                 
41  In terms of an ‘inevitability’ of closer co-operation, and the dangers attached, see, G. 
Majone, Dilemmas of European integration: the ambiguities and pitfalls of integra-
tion by stealth, Oxford 2005: Oxford University Press. 
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tional implementation, the institutional architecture of monetary union itself 
entails an integral treaty commitment to an open-ended or evolutionary process 
of ever closer national/supranational policy-making and administrative co-
operation, and thus to a form of European integration, which can no longer be 
conceived of with reference to a clear apportionment of competences between 
sovereign polities, and can instead only be captured within analytical catego-
ries of governance. At this one level of treaty structure, it may then likewise be 
asserted that an analytical category of governance inevitably wins in normative 
character within monetary policy as an imperative for its existence may be in-
ferred directly, rather than indirectly, from the Treaty. However – and taking 
important note of the logical inconsistency or constitutional irony that arises 
when a political failure to establish a clear normative scheme of government 
becomes an argument in favour of ascription of normative value to an analyti-
cal category of governance – such a conclusion must also be immediately re-
examined. More particularly, it must be carefully re-examined within the con-
text of the Treaty’s further framing of the architecture of monetary union 
within a dual and interconnected commitment to pursuit of price stability, or a 
credible monetary policy, in institutional isolation – or full independence – 
from political process. 
1. A Credibility of Independence 
To recap: the vital lesson taught to us by comitology theorists is one that norm 
cannot be derived from fact, that a constitutional legitimacy for comitology 
cannot simply be established out of a functional need for co-operation and 
technical expertise. Instead, an analytical category of governance can only at-
tain constitutional legitimacy where the rule of law, reborn in proceduralised 
form, establishes cross-referencing or Rückkopplung to the Enlightenment pol-
ity; where, within a supranational context of a universalised commitment to 
‘good’ decision-making beyond the nation state, arguing replaces bargaining in 
a legally-disciplined supranational context of transparency, rationality and pur-
suit of commonly established goals. And yet, it is precisely this normative les-
son which is seemingly most challenged by the peculiarities of the constitu-
tional framing of EU monetary policy. 
Mirroring the international political consensus established during the 1980s, 
the Treaty of European Union and its associated Growth and Stability Pact es-
tablished an economic regime of fiscal discipline at national level to be part-
nered by a supranational monetary policy dedicated to the maintenance of 
price stability, and ultimately to the establishment and maintenance of a credi-
ble common European currency. Now concretised within Article 127(1) 
TFEU, the positive legal commitment to price stability still reflects the post-
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inflationary consensus that economic growth and stability is best served by 
removal of control of monetary policy from the short-sighted and inexpert 
realm of political gain and advantage, and its subsequent lodging within a 
realm of technical expertise and competence committed by a constitutional 
mandate to the long term goals of growth and stability.42 The underlying chal-
lenge to the Enlightenment polity was and is clear and was founded, in Europe 
at least, within the happy coincidence between a pragmatic desire to correct the 
clear failures of the welfare and social state to furnish sustained economic 
growth and the renewed popularity of sections of a post-war economic phi-
losophy, which argue that societal freedom is not only to be secured within the 
collective political community but must rather also be sought within an eco-
nomic and monetary realm constituted, regulated and protected by positive 
law.43 With further political machinations overshadowed by the various prices 
to be paid for German re-unification,44 economic and monetary union within 
the EU was thus also given a further ‘ordo-liberal’ flavour by means of the es-
tablishment of the ECB, whose independence was clearly guaranteed by the 
Treaty, and a further establishment or strengthening of the independence of the 
NCBs making up the ESCB from their own national authorities (now en-
shrined in Article 130 TFEU). 
From political direction of economic affairs to independent management of 
a legally constituted market: the establishment of an independent ESCB/ECB 
in large part mirrors the general efficiency-oriented management trend within 
modern government, whereby large sections of economic activity are now 
overseen by independent regulatory authorities. And yet, the depoliticisation of 
monetary policy, the apparent denial of the sovereign power of the Enlighten-
ment polity – or at least the political power of its representatives – can in this 
case be identified as posing a far more heightened challenge to traditional no-
tions of government and the rule of law; or at least can be so to the exact de-
gree that the leading theorists of independent economic management, or of the 
‘autonomous economy’ are also distinguished by their refusal to engage with 
the ‘system of money’, or the institutional structures of independent central 
banks. At one level, as Niklas Luhmann concedes, this is a simple result of the 
‘complex’ nature of money, a nature which defies rational analysis.45 At an-
other level, however, Giandomenico Majone reveals to us the residual reliance 
of institutional economic theory on traditional notions of government and 
                                                 
42  G. Majone, Regulating Europe, London 1996: Routledge. 
43  Alternatively: the renewed interest in Hayek. 
44  F. Snyder, EMU Revisited: Are we Making a Constitution? What Constitution are we 
Making? EUI Working Paper in Law 98/06. 
45  Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M. 1988: Suhrkamp. 
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transmission belt models of administration when he concedes that central 
banks – although a prime example and result of the logic which seeks to rid 
economic management of the disruptive risk of political short-sightedness – 
must nonetheless be starkly contrasted with independent regulatory authorities. 
In other words, they may not be inserted into his scheme of an ‘independent 
fourth branch of government’ since they are implicated in decision-making, 
which is not simply pareto efficient, but is, instead, explicitly ‘redistributive’ 
in nature.46 
With this concession, the primary mantra of institutional legitimation for 
independent regulatory authorities – the notion that an agency is legitimate 
‘when nobody controls the agency, yet the agency is under control’47 – is un-
masked not as a legitimating tool of governance but rather as a cross-reference 
to the vital normative underpinnings of government. Independent technical or 
economic management is permissible only where a polity can commit itself on 
a long-term basis to regulatory action which will necessarily bring equal bene-
fit for all. In this regard then, the dual institutional scheme of ‘independence’ 
and ‘accountability’ which seeks to legitimise regulatory agencies is predicated 
upon the effort to ensure that the narrow mandate afforded to such institutions 
by the polity is not alienated either by political actors or as a result of the poor 
technical decision-making of the experts gathered within an agency. Regula-
tory agencies are creatures of rather than an exception to the ultra vires rule: 
legal guarantees of independence shield the agency and its mandate from po-
litical interference; at the same time, accountability securing mechanisms, such 
as budgetary control by parliamentary bodies, the appointment of agency 
chiefs by the executive arm of government, judicial review and a very high 
level of transparency during agency operations, ensure constant review of the 
technical adherence of expertise to its mandate by political actors, expert epis-
temic communities and a wider public.48 
By stark contrast, and despite the dedication of the ESCB to the principle of 
an ‘efficient allocation of resources’ (Article 126(1) TFEU) controversy must 
still rage over the pareto efficient status of monetary policy. For all that it is 
embedded within a regime of fiscal discipline, monetary policy can and does 
have redistributive consequences, at the very least as a lack of European labour 
mobility continues to perpetuate economic imbalances between the core and 
                                                 
46  G. Majone, Dilemmas of European integration: the ambiguities and pitfalls of inte-
gration by stealth, Oxford 2005: Oxford University Press. 
47  Terry M. Moe, ‘A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion’, 79:4 (1985) 
The American Political Science Review, pp. 1094-1116. 
48  M. Everson, ‘Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?,’ 1:2 (1995) European Law 
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periphery of monetary union. Equally, the inevitable object of attention from 
aggressive global finance markets, monetary policy can never be conducted 
within a regime dedicated to comprehensive transparency. The ESCB and ECB 
are thus far more to be regarded as bodies placed outside a constraining ultra 
vires rule, bodies with a substantive decision-making competence lying far be-
yond the narrow mandates of political process, whose institutional independ-
ence serves polity restraining goals of a far more fundamental nature. The link 
to governance, to the establishment of ‘ruling’ beyond government, is at once 
apparent as the framing of the ECB/ESCB defies and supersedes even the radi-
cal reframing of the transmission belt model of legitimation to be found within 
theories of the fourth branch of government. Such tensions, however, are simi-
larly given concrete expression in the very visible and potent institutional ten-
sions which characterise the system’s current operations within the EU. 
Given the structural similarities between the ECB/ESB and autonomous 
regulatory authorities, it is no surprise that the Treaty on European Union, and 
now the Lisbon Treaty deploy a legal framework of independence and ac-
countability reminiscent of schemes applying generally to the fourth branch of 
government. As a consequence, the strong statement of ECB independence 
found in Article 130 TFEU is similarly balanced by provisions within the 
Treaty and ECB/ESCB Statute which lay down the concrete mandate of the 
ESCB (Article 127(1) TFEU), the role of the member states, Commission and 
Parliament in the appointment of the President and Vice-President of the ECB 
(Article 50 Statute), the possibility for judicial review of the operations of the 
ECB (Article 35 Statute), and likewise establish a reporting requirement from 
the ECB to the Council, Parliament, Commission and European Council (Arti-
cle 284(3) TFEU). Nonetheless peculiarities and tensions remain that appear to 
confirm the sui generis nature of the ECB/ESCB system. 
Such hidden tensions may initially be noted in the relationship between the 
ECB and the European Parliament. Accordingly, although individual commen-
tators have noted that over the years of the operation of EU monetary policy a 
co-operative relationship has been established between Bank and Parliament, 
Parliament has not effectively asserted its role of expert review of the ECB’s 
pursuit of price stability and has instead tended to treat the Bank as a political 
actor with a potential influence upon the general economic policies of the 
EU.49 Alternatively, although ‘co-operative’ relations have clearly been estab-
lished between Parliament and Bank, whereby the lack of any positive legal 
                                                 
49  F. Atembrink & K. van Duin, ‘The European Central Bank before the European Par-
liament: theory and practice after ten years of monetary dialogue’, (2009) European 
Law Review 561. 
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obligations notwithstanding, the President takes part in debates on the annual 
report and the ECB appears before parliamentary committees, expert monetary 
reports commissioned by the Parliament seem not to have had a quantifiable 
impact upon the ECB’s pursuit of price stability. Meanwhile, in relation to 
general economic policy, or growth and employment in the Euro area, it is also 
noted that the ‘falling number of inquiries in this regard either suggests that 
over time the ECB has worn out MEPs in their efforts to have the ECB place 
more emphasis on its secondary objective, or that MEPs increasingly trust the 
ECB to make the right assessments and to take the right decisions (emphasis 
added).’50 
The tension here is accordingly twofold. Firstly, and perhaps inevitably so 
given the fact that Parliament has no powers of sanction over the ECB – or, 
more particularly has no power of veto over the budget of the Bank or the 
ESCB, which is, instead subject only to ‘independent external audit (Article 
27(1) Statute) 51– the power of the Parliament to subject the bank’s pursuit of 
price stability to forensic scrutiny is necessarily limited. With this, a primary 
technical plank within schemes of accountability – the holding of an independ-
ent body to its mandate by means of budgetary veto – is accordingly weak-
ened. At the same time, however, the weakened position of the European Par-
liament in terms of technical oversight is likewise matched by parliamentary 
confusion over the role of the ECB within the general economic policy of the 
EU. Certainly, Article 127(1) TFEU also commits the ESCB to ‘support the 
general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the 
Treaty of European Union’. In doing so, it appears also to commit the ECB to 
pursuit of Community policies such as employment and growth. Yet, such 
support is to be exercised ‘without prejudice to the objective of price stability’. 
Meanwhile, the Treaty in any case offers few concrete institutional or norma-
tive indicators on how the ECB might offer such support. Alternatively, such 
support can only ever be considered a ‘secondary’ task of the ESCB; a task at 
best perhaps only ever to be viewed as a restraining element within discussions 
on anti-inflationary measures. By the same token, Parliament’s distracting 
concern with this secondary task is surely only to be categorised as a part of 
continuing and evolutionary efforts to establish effective elements of co-
ordination, if not of direct economic influence, between pursuit of EU eco-
                                                 
50  F. Atembrink & K. van Duin (2009: 567-568). 
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nomic and EU monetary policy. In short: an evolving instrument of govern-
ance ‘light’. 
Commentators on the relationship between ECB and European Parliament 
have cautioned that their results cannot be regarded as conclusive and should 
not be overstated, being largely based on quantitative rather than qualitative 
review of the Bank-Parliament dialogue. Nonetheless, they are also confident 
enough to assert that the lack of effective monetary review plus parliamentary 
obsessions with secondary ECB tasks do not ‘necessarily point towards an ef-
fective scrutiny by the EP of the ECB activities.’52 At the same time, however, 
the continuing lack of clarity on the ECB’s role within general EU economic 
policy-making has also led to further tensions within the institutional frame-
work of the EU as doubts have been raised as to the exact extent to which 
Community law applies to the operations of the ECB. ‘There is only one crite-
rion on which the ECB..[.]..will be and should be judged, and that is whether it 
delivers what it is instituted for, namely price stability..[.]..That is the only 
judgment on which the ECB should be judged.’53 Expressed within the context 
of Parliament’s continuing efforts to interrogate the Bank on growth and em-
ployment, the ECB’s implicit assertion that its independence from political 
process is legitimised since it serves and must only serve to ensure price stabil-
ity, thus finds further expression within the OLAF Judgment of the ECJ and the 
efforts of the Bank to establish its own heightened independence within the in-
stitutional scheme of the European Treaty.54 
The controversy highlighted within OLAF, decided prior to the recognition 
of the ECB as an institution of the EU, stems from the wording of Article 130 
TFEU (ex 108 EC): 
“When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred 
upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, nei-
ther the European Central Bank, nor a national central bank..[.]..shall seek or 
take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any 
government of a Member State or from any other body..[.]” 
In establishing its own anti-fraud measures and thus failing to recognise Regu-
lation 1073/1999 endowing the Community anti-fraud body, OLAF, with 
wide-ranging investigative powers, the ECB asserted a very wide measure of 
autonomy for itself in relation to the application of Community law. Chal-
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lenged before the ECJ by the Commission, the Bank sought to justify this posi-
tion, arguing that whilst ‘it does not exist in a legal world totally distinct from 
that of Community law’, it was nonetheless to be regarded as distinct from the 
institutions of the EU. In support of this argument, the ECB pointed – amongst 
other things – to the failure of the Treaty to recognise the ECB as an institution 
of the EU, the ECB’s legal personality, the measure of independence afforded 
to the institution by the then Article 108 EC, the ECB’s independent compe-
tence to make regulations and take decisions, and, interestingly, the failure of 
the Treaty to subject ECB accounts to review by the Court of Auditors.55 
With this non-exhaustive list of justifications, the ECB was seemingly argu-
ing in favour of a wide interpretation of Article 108 EC (now 130 TFEU) and 
asserting a unique degree of autonomy for itself within the EU. Commentators 
have reacted with a degree of disdain towards the arguments of the Bank,56 cit-
ing isolated elements within articles written by employees of the institution 
that seem to suggest that the Bank was seeking to place itself fully beyond the 
reach of Community law. And certainly, statements arguing that the ECB con-
stitutes a ‘Community of its own’, a ‘Community within the Community’57 do 
appear to suggest reluctance on the part of the ECB to accept conventional ap-
plication of the Community’s legal regime to it. Nonetheless, such critique 
and, indeed, the degree of Schadenfreude expressed at the ECJ’s rejection of 
the Bank’s case and its limitation of the institution’s autonomy to a ‘functional 
independence’ in order to ensure price stability,58 perhaps fails fully to appre-
ciate the normative conundrum facing the Bank, or indeed the wide range of 
independence in fact endowed upon the Bank by the Court. 
[T]he Treaty and the Statute confer upon the ECB a high level of independ-
ence..[.]..However, the principle of independence does not imply a total isola-
tion from, or a complete absence of co-operation with, the institutions and bod-
ies of the Community. The Treaty prohibits only influence which is liable to 
undermine the ability of the ECB to carry out its tasks effectively with a view 
to price stability, and which must therefore be regarded as undue.59 
Advocate General Jacobs gives an accurate account of the ECJ’s recogni-
tion of the ‘limited functional independence’ of the Bank. As such, the Court 
does speak directly to the primary concerns of the ECJ’s. Recalling Parlia-
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56  N. Lavranos (2004: 118). 
57  C. Zilioli & M. Selmayer, ‘The external relations of the euro legal area: legal aspects’, 
(1999) CMLR 273, at 284. 
58  N. Lavranos (2004: 118). 
59  Case C-11/00 Commission v ECB, AG Jacobs, paragraph 155. 
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ment’s efforts to assess the operation of the Bank predominantly on the basis 
of its ‘secondary’ contributions to general EU economic policies, statements 
from Bank supporters asserting that the ‘independence in Article 108 EC does 
not provide for any exceptions or restraints’60 are more readily understood. 
From the viewpoint of the Bank, where the only clear and unequivocal man-
date afforded the ECB by the Treaty is pursuit of price stability, its enduring 
credibility as an institution of monetary management is surely only to be as-
sured, if it may pursue this goal in full independence from the influence of all 
other institutions of the Union, including such influence that may be expressed 
within Community law. Certainly, degrees of co-ordination between monetary 
and economic policy may be necessary – think only of the potentially infla-
tionary process of bond buying engaged in by the ECB during the 2010 sover-
eign debt crisis. Yet, such co-ordination must surely be a matter for the ECB 
alone: ‘the decision-making process inside the ECB is not even subject to a 
politician’s suspensory right of veto.’61 
Between fact and positive law, the Bank is a potential victim of indetermi-
nate political compromise, of the vagueness in the drafting of Article 127(1) 
TFEU, of the failure of the EU to establish clear institutional modes of co-
ordination between economic and monetary policies, of increasing political 
pressures for co-ordination and its own credibility-securing demand for clarity 
within EU primary law. To this exact degree then, the ECB must retain credi-
bility by forcefully asserting its unequivocal Treaty-based independence to 
pursue price stability. Equally, this strategic/factual quest for credibility is one 
that is supported by an ECJ, who, by virtue of their formula of ‘limited func-
tional independence’ also create room for case by case analysis of the legality 
or otherwise of application of Community law to the ESCB and ECB.62 
Between fact and norm, this preliminary conclusion nonetheless also leaves 
vital questions open. In the aftermath of OLAF, Bank supporters were keen to 
reiterate that ‘[t]o view the ECB as an independent specialised organisation of 
Community law therefore expresses it subordination not to the political proc-
                                                 
60  C. Zilioli & M. Selmayer, ‘The European Central Bank: an independent specialised 
organisation of Community Law’, (2000) 37 CMLR 591. 
61  N. Lavranos (2004: 118). 
62  C. Zilioli & M. Selmayer, ‘Recent developments in the Law of the European Central 
Bank’, in: P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Yearbook of European Law 2006 (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2006), pp. 63-64, detailing the careful empirical analy-
sis the OLAF regulation is subjected to by the ECJ. The Court is serious in its stated 
intentions to ensure that application of Community laws will not impact upon the abi-
lity of the Bank independently to pursue monetary policy. 
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ess, but to the rule of Community law.’63 At the one level, such a statement 
might be read as a strategic effort to assert the Treaty-based independence of 
the Bank with regard to pursuit of price stability. At another, however, the 
statement can also be read as a plea: placed outside the modern reformulation 
of transmission belt administration, challenged by the equivocal nature of an 
evolving economic and monetary policy, the ECB and ESCB are creatures of 
governance seeking to evolve their own normative framework in order to over-
come the inconsistencies and impossibilities posed by the process of European 
integration. Which form of rule of law can then aid them in this process? 
2. A Credibility of Expertise 
Throughout the global system, a primary justification for the establishment of 
independent central banks has been the recognition that the complexities of 
monetary management are such that politicians and the political system can no 
longer master the vast body of technical detail required to establish a credible 
monetary policy. As a consequence, and once again highlighting the complex 
interplay between norm and fact within schemes of modern governance, it can 
thus be argued that establishment of an independent central bank and system of 
central banks is also commensurate with a normative commitment of the EU to 
the establishment of a high level of expertise in order to ensure the credibility 
of EU monetary policy in general and the operation of the Eurosystem in par-
ticular. Fact appears to dictate norm: the TEU committed the EU to price sta-
bility; the unstated yet vital element within this construction is the integral 
commitment of the system to the establishment of a high level of expertise 
which might ensure credible pursuit of this aim. 
By the same token, however, this underlying factual-normative commit-
ment to the maintenance of a high level of expertise both increases the need for 
and creates its own tensions within the evolving scheme of governance that fo-
cuses upon the ECB and ESCB. On the one hand, the minimal technical re-
sources of the ECB create a pressure for ‘decentralisation’ within the system, 
with the ECB being heavily reliant upon the expert resources of the NCBs in 
order to ensure that the ESCB might fulfil its tasks.64 This requirement for de-
centralised expertise is at once apparent within the nature and number of ad 
hoc consultative committees already established by the Bank under Article 9 of 
                                                 
63  C. Zilioli & M. Selmayer, ‘Recent developments in the Law of the European Central 
Bank’, in: P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Yearbook of European Law 2006 (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2006), pp. 63-64. 
64  Etienne de L’honeux (Secretary General, Banque Centrale de Luxembourg), 3 Eure-
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the ECB’s rules of procedure. Charged with assisting ‘the work of the deci-
sion-making bodies of the ECB’ as regards monetary policy, banknotes and 
statistics, the 12 committees already established deal with highly technical 
tasks, such as payments and settlements (Payment and Settlement Systems 
Committee), which could not otherwise be managed within the ECB. Nonethe-
less, made up of two representatives of the NCBs who are a part of the Euro-
system and two from the Bank, and reporting to the ECB’s Governing Council 
via the Executive Board, doubts may nonetheless be raised about the impact of 
such committees upon the credibility of the Eurosystem as a whole. Doubts 
arise at both a practical and political level. Do committees act as ‘Trojan 
horses’ for the NCBs and member states:65 do they detract from the ability of 
the system to furnish one coherent system of establishment of undisputed tech-
nical expertise; do they furnish national interest with a conduit of influence 
over supranational decision-making? 
On the other hand, however, the dedication of the ECB and ESCB to the es-
tablishment of a high level of expertise also raises far wider issues of govern-
ance within the context of the general co-ordination of EU economic and 
monetary policy. As both the private credit crisis and sovereign debt crisis 
have amply demonstrated, the monetary system within which the ECB and 
ESCB operate is subject to systemic shock and governed by systemic risk. 
Complex risk, as both a vast risk literature and even Community policy teaches 
us,66 entails elements both of technical assessment and of political manage-
ment; particularly with regard to the question of which level of risk are we 
prepared to tolerate. To what degree then, must the ECB/ESCB be receptive to 
societal impulses or ‘messages’ from a political realm, which reflect concerns 
far beyond the structure of price stability? 
IV. Eurosystem Governance within the Rule of Law 
This final point perhaps provides the key to the conundrum: in contrast to 
schemes of European governance commonly associated with the Commis-
sion’s exercise of national/supranational competences (comitology), govern-
ance within the ECB/ESCB – and more pressingly, within the Eurosystem – 
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exists not within the multiple tensions of intergovernmentalism versus supra-
nationalism, arguing versus bargaining, and good versus technical decision-
making, but rather within a more streamlined, but arguably far more immanent 
tension between the constitutional aspiration for expert conduct of autonomous 
monetary policy and continuing, if more diffusely stated, concerns that the ac-
tions of the ECB/ESCB should be ‘controllable’, both in terms of application 
to it of the regime of community law, and with regard to ‘political influence’ in 
the matter of the co-ordination of the economic and monetary policy of the Un-
ion. At the time of writing, banking and sovereign debt crises have hogged the 
headlines and have determined that the question of the ‘political’ place of the 
ECB/ESCB within the governance of the European Union has morphed from a 
topic of purely academic concern into an issue of popular consternation. None-
theless, this belated public spotlight on Bank activities should not detract from 
the simple fact that the ECB/ESCB has been navigating this tension for over a 
decade and has similarly done so within the further complicating context of a 
fluid division of competences between the NCBs and the ECB. 
As a result, the vital question is not one of the identification of a mode of 
governance, which might aid the Eurosystem to overcome the current crisis. 
Rather, the core issue is one of the pinpointing of a suitable manner of legiti-
mating the day-to-day governance structures of the ECB/ESCB, and Eurosys-
tem, as well as the Bank’s capacity to manage a crisis; and, more particularly, 
doing so within a proceduralised rule of law, which establishes, if not a mode 
of reference to, at least a degree of congruence with the Enlightenment polity – 
i.e., to its universal and ‘rationalist’ aspirations. The analysis accordingly pro-
ceeds in three stages. First, a potential normative structure for governance of 
the ‘system’ is elaborated; secondly, normative lessons learned are practically 
applied to the establishment of comitology ‘proper’ within the Bank. In a final 
section, however, the essay also concludes with a far broader consideration of 
the problem of the political co-ordination of monetary and economic union and 
a critical appraisal of the history of the establishment of European monetary 
union. 
1. The primacy of ECB accountability for and within the system 
As noted, the treaty structure established to govern monetary union remains 
indistinct in two particular regards: 
(a) Article 127(1) TFEU, although committing the ECB/ECSB to price sta-
bility, appears also to suggest that the Central Bank should play a sup-
porting role within general Union economic policy; 
(b) Equally, however, the supranantional impulse which deems the Govern-
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ing Council to be the architect of monetary policy is – to a degree at 
least – open to question, as NCBs are not apportioned distinct subordi-
nate competences, but instead play an integral part within and beyond 
the Eurosystem. 
This leaves the analysis with two particular questions: is the ECB a general or 
economic actor; and, further, is the ECB/ESCB a decentralised, federal or uni-
tary system? At the normative level, the answers to these questions must ini-
tially appear to be unsatisfactory. 
(a) Notwithstanding Treaty’ referencing to ‘general economic policies, the 
ECB/ESCB can only be regarded as a specific economic actor, dedicated 
by means of its heightened independence to pursuit of price stability. 
(b) The ECB/ESCB must be considered a unitary system, dominated by the 
decision-making of the Governing Council and Executive Board, and 
dedicated, at decentralised level, simply to the best possible integration 
of necessary national expertise within such decision-making. 
Thus, not only is the bank placed beyond the modern reformulation of the 
transmission-belt model by virtue of heightened independence, it is also seem-
ingly wholly alienated from the Enlightenment polity with regard to the purely 
technocratic definition of its mandate. Equally, the relegation of nation influ-
ence within the system to a status of a ‘pure technical input’ seemingly severs 
all possible links with representative process at member state level, and further 
appears to deny the paradoxical reality of an expert process of decision-
making, which, confronted always with issues of systemic risk, must surely 
always be implicated within redistributive, rather than simply pareto efficient 
allocation of resources. 
However, and making renewed call to the German Constitutional Court’s 
preparedness to evaluate its application of constitutional norms to a complex 
European reality ‘in the light of circumstances’, such a stark formulation may 
nonetheless be argued to be the best currently available to allow us to bridge the 
gap between facts and norms, to ease the integral tension between governance 
imperatives within the ESCB/ECB and assertion of the rule of law over the 
ECB/ESCB and likewise, and vitally so, in order to ensure the credibility of the 
young Euro currency. At one level, such an assertion derives from the wholly 
positive lessons of traditional constitutional theory: certainly, independent cen-
tral banks may lie outside the transmission-belt model of legitimation; yet, in 
Europe, at least, we may identify one highly successful historical model of an 
independent bank – the Bundesbank – whose autonomous status was ‘constitu-
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tionalised’ by the German Constitutional Court,67 the selfsame Court which rec-
ognised the transfer of competences to the ECB within an ordo-liberal reading 
of the Maastricht Treaty.68 Although the particular conditions for the success of 
this model will be treated in more detail in a concluding section, it may nonethe-
less be asserted here that to the primary legal commitments of the TFEU repre-
sents the extension beyond the national constitutional settlement of a polity-
restraining goal of depoliticised monetary stability. As such, it similarly makes 
cross-reference to the goals of the Enlightenment constitution, to a ‘universal’ or 
cross-border commitment to a shared goal of fiscal restraint, governed by an 
equally universal commitment to the transparency of de-politicised technical ex-
pertise. To the extent that monetary union is governed by technical criteria, it 
may be measured and monitored, not only for it effectiveness, but also for it ‘ci-
vility’; that is for its resilience towards disruptive political influence, at national 
or at supranational level. 
Directly related to this point, however, more defensive considerations may 
be identified which require us to view the ECB/ESCB system – for the pur-
poses of effective application of the rule of law – as a unitary, independent sys-
tem for which and within which, the ECB must retain a primary accountability. 
Alternatively, although the facts of governance may yet require a certain de-
gree of co-ordination between monetary and economic policy, the strictures of 
the rule of law nonetheless demand that such co-ordination must be visible and 
transparent. To this exact degree then, the ‘Trojan horse’ of political influence 
over and within the Bank must be firmly resisted. On the one hand, the uni-
versalism of the common European commitment to price stability would be 
undermined were the Bank to be subject to institutionalised political pressures 
at supranational level or within the Eurosystem itself (national influences). On 
the other hand, public transparency over the day-to-day operations of monetary 
policy is self-defeating in terms of the credibility of the Eurosystem. Money 
and money markets are complex and volatile, such that currency governance 
must be conducted behind closed doors in order to ensure the fact of a credible 
currency. Accordingly, the primary counterweight to the system’s independ-
ence – at the same time its constitutionalised guarantor for a universal com-
mitment to the rationality of technical decision-making – needs must reside in 
a dual of accountability, not of annual budgetary control, published agendas 
and immanent expert/public review of daily decision-making, but rather in an 
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internal guarantee of technocratic excellence, and an external guarantee of ac-
countability for the results of autonomous monetary decision-making. Norma-
tively, only one institution and one institution alone can be held politically and 
legally accountable for the conduct of monetary policy, for its technical excel-
lence and co-ordination with the general economic policy of the European Un-
ion – the highly visible ECB. 
2. Committees of technical excellence 
This normative condition for a single institution to be held accountable for the 
operation of the ESCB is expressed in Article 129 TFEU which states that 
‘The ESCB shall be governed by the decision-making bodies of the European 
Central Bank which shall be the Governing Council and the Executive Board.’ 
While the NCBs are an integral part of the ESCB, they are required by the 
ESCB Statute to act ‘in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the 
ECB’ and the Governing Council is given the authority to ‘take the necessary 
steps to ensure compliance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB’.69 
External accountability, from a strict rule of law perspective rather than a 
results-based norm, is calibrated in terms of reporting obligations. According 
to the ECB website, ‘To retain legitimacy, an independent central bank must 
be accountable to democratic institutions and the general public for its actions 
in the pursuit of its mandate. The ECB has precise reporting obligations … 
[which] are laid down in Article 15 of its Statute’.70 Internal accountability 
may be derived from Article 9(2) of the Statute which gives the ECB the re-
sponsibility for ensuring that all its Treaty-specified tasks ‘are implemented 
either by its own activities … or through the national central banks.’ However, 
this responsibility is not seen to detract from ‘the principle of decentralisation 
which is at the root of the System’. Hence the ‘Organisational principles for 
the fulfilment of Eurosystem functions by all members of the Eurosystem’ em-
phasise cooperation and teamwork and enjoin all members to contribute strate-
gically and operationally to the goals of the Eurosystem while ‘act[ing] and 
appear[ing] as a cohesive and unified entity … speak[ing] with a single 
voice…close to the citizens of Europe.71 
These organisational principles contain the seeds of a sui generis Eurosys-
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tem comitology immediately distinguishable from Commission comitology. 
The act of delegation in the former may be seen to be an intra-organisational 
allocation of functions in a context where the organisation’s – in this case the 
Eurosystem – boundaries and objectives are specified by law. For the latter, 
delegation takes the form of an inter-organisational apportionment of respon-
sibilities between the Council, Commission and committees and the interaction 
of the three defines the boundaries and objectives of a particular piece of legis-
lation. The contrast between the two types of comitology has its origins in the 
high premium placed on ECB independence: whereas Commission comitology 
is aimed at creating a deliberative forum where political, executive and admin-
istrative concerns can be comprehensively aired, any Eurosystem comitology 
will fundamentally be aimed at accomplishing its depoliticised monetary ob-
jectives by the deliberations of committees of technical excellence. The ESCB 
organisational principles recognise these aims and identify effectiveness and 
efficiency in decision-making, cost-efficiency, developing control systems and 
performance indicators and exploiting ECB/NCB synergies as critical organ-
isational goals. 
What path then should Eurosystem comitology take? Its intra-organisational 
character provides an important point of departure allowing for flexibility in 
the construction of its deliberative procedures. ECB committees are currently 
established by the Governing Council under the Rules of Procedure.72 Each 
committee may have up to two members from each of the Eurosystem NCBs 
and the ECB. The Governing Council lays down each committee’s mandate 
and appoints the chair, while the ECB provides the necessary secretarial assis-
tance.73 Committees report back to the Governing Council via the Executive 
Board.74 
Each committee has a purely advisory function. They do not have decision-
making powers although some committees have implementation powers. To 
underline this point, the ECB’s Rules of Procedure are careful to refer to com-
mittee ‘members’, and not ‘representatives’ or ‘experts’. The mandates granted 
to committees by the Governing Council may have varying amounts of detail. 
In the case of monetary policy, for instance, there are no implementation re-
quirements. The mandate is so detailed so as to make the task of the Monetary 
Policy Committee effectively no more than an administrative one. By contrast 
the Payment and Settlements Systems Committee will have the authority to 
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implement specified tasks, as it is impractical for the Governing Council to de-
cide on the technicalities of the payment and settlement systems. 
The need for internal technical excellence to deliver externally credible re-
sults may be seen to require ECB committees to develop beyond their current 
structures to create their own form of comitology. Despite the independence of 
each NCB from its own polity and the supranational independence of the ECB, 
tensions within the system can arise at least at three points: (i) conflicts around 
the perceived needs and views of various Member States (e.g. those of the core 
versus the periphery) in deliberations within a committee’s mandate; (ii) inter-
pretation of the terms of the committees mandate itself; and (iii) the scope of 
the actual decision-making or implementation powers that it may be possible 
for each committee to have. While not every manifest tension will lead to an 
absence of consensus at committee level, the independence and credibility of 
the system will depend on achieving consensus on every point that counts. 
Eurosystem comitology requires not so much a ‘regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny’ as the ability to use its intra-organisational flexibility to produce con-
sensual, externally-visible results with internal accountability. Several ground 
rules may be outlined for such a comitology (and, indeed, traces of these rules 
may already be found in the ESCB’s organisational principles): 
(1) Consensus is king. The ESCB must speak with ‘a single voice’. While dis-
senting views may be aired and even encouraged, such dissent must be ex-
pressed and resolved within the system. 
(2) While a politicitisation of views along national lines may be considered to 
be inevitable, the normative treaty basis for each committee has to be su-
pranational price stability. 
(3) Members are not national representatives, but function in a technical ca-
pacity with clear knowledge of conditions prevailing in national markets 
and their knock-on effect on EU and world markets. 
(4) Publication of best practice guidelines for committees in order to ensure 
‘internal’ transparency and technical dominance and the promotion of ex-
ternal credibility. 
(5) Failures at committee level to reach a consensus should be flagged to the 
Governing Council with detailed reasons provided for both the majority 
view and the reasons for dissent. The Governing Council should then have 
a fixed period to provide its own (binding) view. The length of the fixed 
period would be determined by the urgency and gravity of the matter under 
consideration. 
The final point is perhaps determinative: although and fluid competences be-
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tween national and supranational instances notwithstanding, the ECB remains 
the one institution which can be held politically and legally to account for the 
results of the Eurosystem. The ECB can and must never be placed in a position 
whereby it is held to account for the actions of others. The system must remain 
a unitary system for the independent pursuit of monetary credibility through 
technical excellence. 
V. Comitology’s sting in the tail: the deliberative place of the 
ECB within the European Union 
In a final analysis, however, there is still much about economic and monetary 
union within the EU that remains unsatisfactory, if not suspect. At a time of 
extreme crisis within the Eurosystem, European publics might be justified in 
expressing extreme dissatisfaction with a mode of European integration that 
has consistently masked lack of political agreement upon the goals of union 
(federal or supranational?) within structures that invite governance beyond a 
conventional understanding of the rule of law, but which are – at core – a re-
flection of the EU’s continuing inability fully to integrate political with eco-
nomic will, to step beyond a piecemeal integration telos and properly to inte-
grate the infinite range of European social, cultural, political and economic in-
terests within a coherent and co-ordinated constitutional structure. Traditional 
voices of normative suspicion have grown in intensity since the failure of the 
constitutional convention and have been correct to do so. 
In the particular case of the Eurosystem, European publics are similarly cor-
rect to vent their varying frustrations with a process of stealthy spill-over, 
which – at a moment of extreme – crisis has seen various national interests in 
fiscal sobriety, in democratically, rather than market driven deficit reduction 
and in statistical exactitude undone by a political lack of leadership and hon-
esty, both at the time of the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty and 
during subsequent enlargements of the Eurosystem area. The political indeci-
sion that haunts the entire process of European integration has now been pain-
fully unmasked as the Euro – the cornerstone of future European integration – 
has been attacked by world money markets unimpressed by the continents’ 
continuing political timidity and normative indecision. 
Nonetheless, it should equally be noted, that the ECB/ESCB are victims 
rather than a party to political failings within Europe. Seen from the perspec-
tive of the upholding of the rule of law, the ECB’s unwavering historical 
commitment to its own independence and the pursuit of monetary stability 
cannot but be applauded as an act of constitutional courage. Equally, however, 
the Bank’s relative success in maintaining the stability of the Euro at a time of 
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crisis, of ensuring the integrity of a system containing various by now compet-
ing national interests (individual NCBs have spoken largely spoken with one 
voice75) and of co-ordinating its monetary policies with the economic policies 
of the Council, European Council and individual member state governments is 
also highly instructive for the analysis. 
In this latter regard then, a final reference must be made to the historical 
conditions for the success of an ordo-liberal conduct of monetary policy within 
the Federal Republic of Germany. As the fathers of German constitutionalism 
and ordo-liberalism taught us, normative commitments to monetary stability 
drew their enduring force from the dual constitutional commitment to entwined 
social and economic ordering. Walter Eucken highlighted the interconnection 
between the German economic constitution and the Republic’s Sozialstaat.76 
In its transference to the supranational realm, the positive legal commitment to 
price stability lost its cross-referencing to the social and the political formula-
tion of the social within the Enlightenment polity: the social competence – 
even post Lisbon remains firmly anchored at national level. Nonetheless, even 
at this ‘culturally denuded’ supranational level, it would appear that the consti-
tutional values of co-ordination and social/economic integration are possible, 
or at least are possible to the degree that the ECB and its President have man-
aged and continue to manage to overcome tensions between the political, eco-
nomic and social aspirations of Europeans and their representatives. 
In short then, the vital lesson to be learned from Commission comitology – 
or at least, the most refined of theories legitimating Commission comitology – 
may be one of the need to ensure and secure ‘deliberative supranationalism’ 
within European governance. Certainly, where the talk is of deliberative dis-
cussion and co-operation between the ECB and politicised nodes of European 
governance, the analysis has moved far beyond the sphere of application of the 
rule of law. Nonetheless, this might still be a realm within which the values in-
herent to a proceduralised rule of law have important application. Firstly, since 
the vital recognition of universalism within deliberative supranationalism 
would require national governments and the ECB to ameliorate the impacts of 
their sovereign decision-making upon other sovereign instances (i.e. upon in-
dividual member states, as well as on the pursuit of a supranational monetary 
policy). But secondly, since co-operation between autonomous instances of 
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monetary decision-making and representative instances of political decision-
making might thus also be elevated beyond ‘bargaining’ to a process of ‘argu-
ing’, governed by values of rationality, transparency and the pursuit of com-
mon aims. 
Certainly, we cannot hope for wholesale transference to the supranational 
level of the social ties, cultural mechanisms of review (national press scrutiny) 
or, indeed, concrete normative structures (dual constitutional ordering), which 
ensured that the President of a Bundesbank would – where appropriate – co-
ordinate that Bank’s actions with those of the Bundesregierung. Nonetheless, 
where all European and national organs commit themselves publicly to shared 
European values of deliberation, and such deliberation is constantly scrutinised 
within the fragmented and common European public realm, might we not hope 
that governance at European level will continue to give us sufficient cross-
referencing to the government of the Enlightenment polity? Perhaps the simple 
fact that the name of Jean-Claude Trichet is now one known to all Europeans, 
and his actions and those of the ECB are subject to heightened public scrutiny, 
is a significant step in this direction. 
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